Nimitz also later said that the battle was “essentially a victory of intelligence.” Up to a point, Nimitz’s statement is true. Nimitz’s decision, although audacious and risky, was not as much of a “desperate gamble” that some accounts have portrayed, but rather was completely in accord with the principle of “calculated risk” that guided Nimitz and other operational commanders during the battle. Actually, the Japanese carriers arrived a day later than planned, but Layton’s estimate had accounted for weather and the Japanese plan had not ( see attachment H-006-2 “ISR at Midway”). Using all means of intelligence at his disposal, including his intimate understanding of Japanese thought process from his years of language training in Japan, Layton came up with an estimated bearing, range, and time from Midway Island (325 degrees, 175 nautical miles, at 0600 4 June 1942) that Admiral Nimitz later said was “five degrees, five miles, and five minutes off.” The actual location was a little father off than Nimitz stated, but not by much. Armed with this useful, but still somewhat vague code-breaking intelligence, Nimitz nevertheless insisted that his intelligence officer, Commander Edwin Layton, produce a more precise estimate of where the Japanese carriers would be located when first detected. Based on breaking the Japanese Navy general operating code (JN-25B) and the work of Commander Joseph Rochefort’s team in Station Hypo at Pearl Harbor, Nimitz knew that Midway was the objective of Japanese Operation “MI,” knew the approximate timing and approximate forces employed (four or five carriers), and knew that the concurrent Aleutian operation (“AL”) was not the Japanese main effort. “OPFOR” did exactly what Nimitz did, with results that were remarkably close to what actually happened, but his actions were ruled “impossible” by the game umpire, and the Japanese game losses were resurrected.)Īdmiral Nimitz, on the other hand, had a very accurate understanding of Japanese intent, based on intelligence, of which code-breaking was only a part, albeit significant. (In pre-battle war games, the Japanese commander playing the U.S. He had no idea the American carriers were already northeast of Midway waiting in ambush, and refused to consider the possibility that his plan might be compromised. Yamamoto was further hampered by a poorly planned and executed surveillance and reconnaissance effort. However, by doing so, the main body and other formations in the highly complex Japanese plan had no opportunity to engage U.S. forces that took the bait of the Midway invasion force. To a degree, his plan worked, in that Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz did not know that Yamamoto’s main body of battleships was trailing several hundred miles behind the Japanese carriers (with Yamamoto embarked on the new super-battleship Yamato), intent on ambushing U.S. Therefore, Yamamoto’s force distribution was not optimized for mutual support, but rather for operational deception, to conceal the true extent of the forces employed so as to not prematurely spook the Americans into refusing to give battle. In terms of numbers and capabilities of the decisive weapon system of the battle, dive-bombers, the two sides were at rough parity.Ĭommander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto based his plan on inadequate intelligence and an inaccurate understanding of American intent, specifically the incorrect assumption that the “demoralized” Americans would have to be drawn out to fight. Navy none but the four carriers were in a position to effect the outcome of the battle at the critical point and time. Although the total number of Japanese forces committed to the Midway operation (essentially, almost every operational ship in the Imperial Japanese Navy) far exceeded that of the U.S. However, the United States had some advantages as well, such as the element of surprise, radar, superior damage control, and the ability of U.S. The Japanese had some significant qualitative advantages, principally the ability to launch a massive integrated multi-carrier strike package rapidly, fighter maneuverability, and better torpedoes. aircraft carriers (233 aircraft) and 25 escorts and an island airfield (127 aircraft = 360 total U.S. It was not, however, a “miracle.” At the decisive point of contact, it was four Japanese aircraft carriers (248 aircraft) and 20 escorts against three U.S. ![]() aircraft and aircrew responsible for the victory. The Battle of Midway (4–6 June 1942) was one of the most critical battles of World War II, and one of the most one-sided battles in all of history, although achieved at a very high cost for the U.S. Japanese Midway Operations Order, Commander’s Estimate of the Situation
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